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Abstract: The discrepancies arisen between the two totalitarian communist leaders - – Joseph 
Vissarionovici Stalin (The Soviet Union) and Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia) – contained in themselves 
the seed of destruction of the political and economic Stalinist monopoly regarding the Danube. Our 
study proposes to identify, through scientific analysis of contemporary sources of the event, the 
aftermath of this conflict regarding the political evolution of the international regime of the Danube, 
as well as the manner in which the dissolution of the communist bloc affected the post-war 
international relations. Between 1948 and 1953, until the death of Stalin, the conflict blocked the 
Danube for both communist states from the river's basin as well as in terms of international trade that 
characterized the previous period (interwar). Stalin viewed the Danube River as a factor of influence 
and political pressure that meant to subordinate the small communist states. After Stalin's death 
(March 1953), Khrushchev had to make a series of major concessions regarding Yugoslavia and other 
communist states which led to the transformation of the international regime of the Danube and to a 
"thaw" between East and West. 
Keywords: Cold War; international statute of the Danube; diplomacy after WWII; the Stalinization 
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1. Introduction 
At the end of the Second World War the international situation was extremely 
favorable to the implementation of the expansionist objectives of the Soviet Union 
in regards to the Danube River. Under the generous slogan "the Danube belongs to 
the riparian" the soviet diplomacy wore a fierce diplomatic war with former major 
allies - the United States, France and Britain - in order to impose its post-war 
monopoly over the entire Danube basin. At the same time, the small Danubian 
states were required to internally adopt the communist regimes, characterized by 
obedience and subservience to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the small Danubian 
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states were economically strangled by the great communist power through various 
means, including through the confiscation of their own vessels. Thus, on the eve of 
the Danube Conference in Belgrade (30 July-18 August 1948) Moscow had 
become the political and economic hegemony of the Danube. 
And yet, paradoxically, the seeds of the destruction of the political and economic 
Stalinist monopoly regarding the Danube were not triggered by the antagonism 
between East and West, but were the aftermath of divergences occurred within the 
communist monolith between the two leaders: Joseph Stalin (Soviet Union) and 
Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia). Our study aims to identify the implications of this 
conflict regarding the political evolution of the international regime of the Danube 
as well as the manner in which the dissolution of the communist bloc affected the 
post-war international relations. 
 
2. The Historical Context Preceding the Outbreak of the Tito – Stalin 
Conflict 
The tensions between the two communist leaders gradually rose during the 
development of World War II and accelerated in the early 1948. The source of the 
conflict did not lie in different ideological or doctrinal motifs, but sprung from the 
two leaders’ incompatible notions regarding the relations between the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia, namely the relations between the two "fraternal" communist 
parties. The ideological disputes were later on artificially created in order to 
explain the split between the two totalitarian leaders. Overall, Yugoslavia endured 
the Soviet’s attempts to penetrate its economy and army, which prompted Stalin to 
abandon the previous initiatives, namely to infiltrate his own agents in the 
Yugoslavian institutional structures, and move on to a new stage, one in which Tito 
would be openly attacked in the communist media or, if necessary, physically 
removed. In his turn, Tito tried to internally increase his prestige and authority and, 
at least, in 1948, to find allies among the communist states along the Danube basin 
and the Balkans for the establishment of a socialist federation, which was from the 
beginning a threat to the obedient satellite systems managed by Stalin. In the spring 
of 1948, through a series of letters addressed to the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party from Yugoslavia, Stalin accused Tito of deviationism from the 
Marxist-Leninist line as a consequence of adopting an internal policy favoring the 
bourgeoisie and the wealthy peasants or for an attitude considered by Moscow as 
being unfriendly towards the representatives of this country. Meanwhile, Stalin 
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tried to divide the Yugoslav party by supporting an anti-Titoist wing, but this 
process halted with the arrest of two pro-Soviet members of the Central 
Committee: Zujovic and Hebrang. To force the removal of Tito, the Cominform, 
following an extraordinary meeting, on the 28th of May 1948 a resolution was 
adopted through which the Bolshevik party and other parties condemned anti-
Marxist Titoism, anti-Soviet policy and excluded Yugoslavia from this 
organization. The resolution invited the "healthy elements" within the Yugoslav 
Communist Party to overthrow Tito and to rejoin Yugoslavia with the Soviet bloc 
(Hodos, 1984, p.4-5). The split between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia become 
inevitable because Tito could not be subordinated by Stalin, becoming the number 
one enemy for the Moscow leader, in the context in which Titoism substituted 
Trotskyism as the incarnation of evil in the communist ideological bloc. 
 
3. The Implications of the Conflict in the Context of the Danube 
Conference in Belgrade (30 July– 18 August 1948) 
However, the Tito-Stalin split was not obvious during the course of the Danube 
River Conference in Belgrade. On the contrary, from its outset, the establishment 
of the Belgrade Conference did not take into account the traditional diplomatic 
rules concerning the development of such international negotiations and was 
conducted, from one end to another, by one delegation, that of Soviet Russia. The 
outcome of the debates did not leave room for interpretations, given that a minority 
of three Western powers - the Unite States, Britain and France - stood no chance in 
expressing their own arguments before the compact bloc of seven communist 
countries (Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria 
and Ukraine), grouped around a single voice, that of Moscow. In reality, the 
Western Allies were aware that they will not truly obtain a regime guaranteeing 
freedom of navigation to all flags, but in the name of compromise that usually 
accompanied such international negotiations, hoped to obtain some concessions 
from the Soviet diplomacy. Placed from the beginning in front of a hostile 
atmosphere in which they could not freely express their opinions, the Western 
powers have wondered why they were invited to participate in the Belgrade 
Conference in the first place. (Focas, 1987, p. 596)  
As expected, the Soviet Union and the communist states satellite, its docile 
subordinates, voted for the Soviet project proposed by Andrey Yanuarevich 
Vyshinsky in Belgrade. What unpleasantly surprised the Western minority - The 
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United States, Britain and France - was eloquently described by the US delegate 
Cavendish Cannon. “Most of the participants in the Commission, with a cynical 
solidarity, avoided proposing even the lightest amendment to the text which 
resulted from their discussions, a fact that marks a unique event in the history of 
international negotiations” (Focas, 1987, p. 621). Basically, the project proposed 
by the Soviet delegate was adopted without being even slightly amended, which 
prompted the historian Josef L. Kunz to state that: “The painting of the Belgrade 
Conference can only be named a caricature of an international conference under a 
totalitarian regime, (...) the danger of a new era of barbarism, marked by a 
pronounced decline of good manners in diplomacy” (Kunz, 1949, p. 113). 
The solution adopted in the capital of Yugoslavia, was based on the imposition of a 
regime which was unique, fixed, established and managed only by the riparian 
through a single Danube Commission, in reality there being organized two special 
Committees, the first for the Iron Gates and the second for the maritime sector of 
the river. Officially, on the 15th of November 1949, only four days after the newly 
established Danube Commission met for the first time in Galatz, the United States, 
France and Britain have submitted separate protest notes to the governments of 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 
declaring that they do not recognize the validity of the Convention of 18th of 
August 1948 as it flagrantly violates the principle of internationalization of 
navigable waterways. (Danube Commission, 1950, p. 542) 
The prestigious US historian and diplomat John C. Campbell1 wondered, only a 
year after the scene which occurred in the capital of Yugoslavia, what kind of 
triumph did Andrey Yanuarevich Vyshinsky, the Soviet representative, obtain in 
the Belgrade Conference? Basically, the Soviet Union had granted itself the 
legality of the already owned control. The new Convention had not been 
recognized by nations outside the communist bloc and the Danube Commission 
could not operate on the Upper Danube sector, with the exception of the area under 
Soviet control. Therefore, Austria and The Federal Republic of Germany, whose 
territory contained the first section of the navigable river, remained outside the 
jurisdiction of the given Commission. Without the participation of the Western 
states and without their support, the technical work and the development of the 
river basin were seriously affected. (Campbell, 1949, p. 326) 
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In the context of the outbreak of the conflict between Stalin and Tito in the spring 
of 1948 we wonder why Tito did not take advantage of the Danube Conference to 
try to get closer to Western democracies and why Yugoslavia behaved like any 
other obedient satellite of Moscow. The answer can only emerge by understanding 
Tito's personality, his policy at the time and in the context of 1948. Firstly, Tito 
was a convinced communist and in 1948 he was still trying to find allies among 
other communist states against the Moscow authoritarianism. In fact, despite the 
harsh statements appeared in the Soviet press that compared Tito to Hitler, in 
reality the decisive split between the two occurred only at the beginning of 1949. 
 
4. The Consequences of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict on the 
International Regime of the Danube between 1948 and 1953 
The Danube Convention in Belgrade contains 47 articles divided into five chapters, 
two appendices and an Additional Protocol. According to the Belgrade Agreement, 
the entire international navigable course of the river was placed under the 
supervision of the Danube Commission, composed of one representative of each 
riparian state, whereof, for a period of three years, a President, a Vice President and 
a General -Secretary were elected. The Commission disposed of a permanent 
Secretariat and of all the necessary services for the its function, employees being 
recruited from among Member States. The Quorum of the Commission was set at 
five members and the decisions had to be taken following the majority of votes (the 
full text of the Belgrade Convention was published in the Official Monitor, 1948, 
No. 2).  
The Soviet Union did not have enough time to enjoy the success of the Danube 
Conference as the relations between Tito and Stalin have rapidly deteriorated after 
the Belgrade Agreement. In terms of Soviet domination over the river, the Tito - 
Stalin conflict divided the Danube River into three sectors:  
1) From the Austrian border until the small port Baračka, approximately 312 miles 
through which the river crosses a part of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; 
2) The Yugoslav area of the Danube, which exclusively crosses the territory of this 
state, summing up 236 miles between Baračka and Kasilievo (the Yugoslavian 
bank) / Baziash (the Romanian bank), to which another 161 miles, that formed the 
Romanian-Yugoslav border, and the sector in which the Danube river entered in 
the area of the Iron Gates and Cataracts, were added;  
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3) The Lower Danube firstly included 289 miles of Romanian-Bulgarian border, 
plus another 142 miles through which the river exclusively crossed the Romanian 
territory up to its confluence with the Prut and finally, the last 40 miles through the 
navigable Sulina channel up to the river's mouth in the Black Sea. 
Due to the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, Moscow kept its political influence on the 
first and the last sector of the Danube, but in terms of actual inland water 
transportation the Soviet control could only manifest itself on the Lower Danube, 
as Belgrade blocked the navigation of Soviet ships both on its own sector and 
upstream. (Spulber, 1954, p. 238) 
Regarding the Danube regime, the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict began by Moscow's 
refusal to engage Belgrade in the direct management of the newly created Danube 
Commission. In the first session of this Commission, opened in Galati on 11th of 
November 1949, the Soviet Union had imposed its complete control over the newly 
formed body through the Secretariat and through the rights which the secretary, 
namely the Soviet Morozov, had just then obtained. Thus, Morozov could name all 
the members of the Secretariat, taking advantage of the ambiguous wording of the 
text which hid the possibility of imposing the desired staff by the Soviet 
authorities. According to it, the Secretariat members of the Danube Commission 
were appointed on “merits” and not on geographical or state criteria. Consequently, 
Yugoslavia received only four minor posts in the Secretariat and its related 
services, which blocked the influence and the power of decision of this State in the 
Commission. (Catell, 1960, pp. 384-385) The Soviet Morozov was also the one 
who organized the Secretariat and its related services, established the permanent 
activity of its staff or negotiated on behalf of the Danube Commission with the 
governmental territorial authorities. Meanwhile, no mechanisms to control, 
subordinate or limit the power of the Secretary of the Danube Commission had 
been stipulated, not even by the representatives of the Member States in this 
Commission. (Danube Commission, 1950, p. 542)  
In subsequent years, the Yugoslavian situation in the Danube Commission had 
considerably depreciated, its representative suffering enough humiliation. 
Documents that were to be signed were briefly advanced before him, his requests 
to be allotted additional time to review and consult his own government were 
refused or his solicitations to be informed were not answered. Moreover, he was 
not summoned to attend the semi-annual meetings in the subcommittees organized 
in order to discuss certain issues or was placed in a committee that was 
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concurrently organized with the plenary session, which put him in the awkward 
position of choosing between attending one or the another; he barely managed to 
get a visa to enter Romania in order to participate in the meetings of the Danube 
Commission, and during his stay in Galatz he met great difficulty regarding 
accommodation. Simultaneously, more and more naval incidents / accidents 
foregrounded the Yugoslavian vessels outside the territorial waters of this State, 
while the Yugoslavian navigation agencies have been seriously disadvantaged in 
Romania and Bulgaria or even banned in the Soviet Union. (Catell, 1960, pp. 385-
386) 
The Yugoslavian reply firstly consisted in protests. On the 13th of June 1950, 
Yugoslavia submitted an official note to the Soviet Union recalling the obstacles 
their own vessels have met while sailing on the Danube outside the national sector. 
Within the fourth meeting of the Danube Commission, opened on the 23rd of May 
1951, the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs announced the permanent 
Secretariat of this Commission that his country had established its own rules of 
navigation, not taking into account the requirements of the Soviet Union in the 
Danube Commission, the latter constituting, in the view of the Yugoslav 
authorities, a flagrant violation of the sovereign rights of the river's riparian states. 
Moreover, the Yugoslav delegate abandoned the works of the Danube Commission 
as a sign of protest on the 2nd of June 1951, Yugoslavia also noting its financial 
contribution to the body's budget (Danube Commission, 1951, pp. 844-845). In the 
next ordinary sessions of the Danube Commission in July and December 1952, the 
Yugoslav motion was rejected by the representatives of the Soviet Union and its 
obedient acolytes (Danube Commission, 1953, pp. 300-301). However, the Soviet 
Union did not want to exclude or to entirely suspend Yugoslavia from the members 
of the Danube Commission, although it did have the authority to do so. Until the 
death of Stalin (March 1953), the Soviet Union pressured Belgrade through the 
Danube Commission to accept the status quo and its own rules imposed by Stalin 
on the river. 
Another consequence of Yugoslavia seceding from Kremlin's orbit was the 
deliberate delay of the establishment of a Romanian-Yugoslav special joint 
administration at the Iron Gate.1 The provision, stated in the text of the Convention 
of 1948, had remained for a long time merely a concept and only in late 1953 the 
establishment of such a joint administration finally succeeded, but its powers were 
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severely reduced in favor of the Danube Commission (Spulber, 1954, p. 238). Until 
the establishment of that Joint Commission, registered only after Stalin's death, the 
Romanian authorities took over the administration of the Iron Gates, dismissing the 
Yugoslav officials and seizing all facilities on the Romanian bank. In response, 
Yugoslavia had established its own administration on the Yugoslav sector of the 
Danube (Catella, 1960, p. 38). Meanwhile, in order to rebuild its lost prestige in the 
communist bloc and for certain military purposes, the Soviet Union intensively 
supported the project of digging the Danube - Black Sea Channel and forced the 
Romanian government to spend heavily in this respect. (Cojoc, 2000, pp. 342-352)  
Until Stalin's death, a time-frame in which the Soviet control over the Danube 
River was at its peak, the technical activities of developing the river were minimal. 
Moscow had turned its attention to the political side of its dominance, encouraging 
its satellite Members to standardize regulations concerning navigation, police, 
customs or health in order to meet their economic and commercial interests. 
Moreover, in addition to hindering the development of the river's navigability, 
Moscow also blocked the linking of the Danube to its outside world through their 
disinterest concerning the maintenance of the Sulina channel. This arm, placed in a 
special mixed Soviet-Romanian administration and considered to be a segment of 
the international Danube, had not been dredged and repaired as was necessary. On 
the contrary, the Soviet authorities gave great importance to the development of 
their own navigable channel, through the Chilia arm, which led increasingly more 
ships to use this route. Being removed from the custody of the Belgrade 
Convention, the Soviet authorities were unhindered to disadvantage, on the Chilia 
Channel, the vessels of the small communist Danubian states in relation to their 
own flag. (Catell, 1960, pp. 387-388)  
In the Stalinist period (1948-1953) the Danube River's links with other trade routes 
were completely blocked. There had been no contact, not even on an informal 
level, with the West or at least with the Austrian and the Federal-German 
authorities. The Danube Commission, at Moscow's orders, refused to meet the 
demands of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The Western flagged 
vessels were non-existent on the communist portion of the river, navigating only on 
the Austrian and the Federal-German sector due to the linking of the Danube River 
to the Rhine. (Catell, 1960, p. 387)  
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5. Extinguishing the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict after the Death of Stalin 
(March 1953) and Reforming the International Regime of the Danube 
The Soviet Union’s attitude towards the Danube changed dramatically after the 
death of Stalin (March 5, 1953). Just three months after the demise of the Kremlin 
dictator, in June 1953, the Yugoslav delegate returned to the workings of the 
Danube Commission, thereupon requesting the reorganization of the Secretariat 
and of the permanent services, amendments that were meant to dilute the control of 
the Commission held by the Soviets. The Soviet-Yugoslav conflict had been 
extinguished and the issue of the international regime and of the Danube 
Commission, the compromise between Nikita Khrushchev, the new Soviet leader, 
and the Yugoslavian Josip Broz Tito, consisted in the increase of the number of 
officials and the importance of their posts, acquired by the Yugoslavians in the 
Danube Commission. In response, the Belgrade authorities allowed the up-river 
passage of 26 Soviet ships through its own Danube sector. In the ninth plenary 
session of the Danube Commission in December 1953, the model imposed by 
Stalin on the Danube was completely repudiated. (Danube Commission, 1954, p. 
417).  
Within that session, the Yugoslav delegate had focused his requests on two issues: 
the relocation of the headquarters of the Danube Commission from Galati in 
Budapest and a fairer redistribution of posts within the permanent Secretariat. In 
the case of his first request, the Member States have decided that, beginning from 
1954, the headquarters of the Danube Commission are to be moved from Galati to 
Budapest, which remained to date its current location. The decision of relocating 
the headquarters was geographically motivated, Budapest having a more central 
position on the Danube navigable sector, but behind this decision stood mostly 
political considerations, the Galatz port being very close to the Soviet border. 
Basically, the relocation of the Commission's headquarters also had an imagology 
function, namely that it was a sign of the Kremlin's renunciation to its right to 
exercise its totalitarian control over the communist sector of the Danube. After 
1954, the Danube Commission, which had been until that moment a primarily 
technical body, transformed itself into a political body, the delegates of the riparian 
states within the Commission also serving as ambassadors of their countries in 
Hungary (Badescu, 1992, p. 340). The new direction of Moscow's policy towards 
its satellites, characterized by a greater freedom, not limited only on the Danube, 
was translated in the abolition of joint societies in 1954(Anton, 2004, pp. 196-202). 
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These loosening measures have not meant a renunciation of Kremlin's domination 
over mentioned area, but this hegemony will be made, from this day forward, in a 
much more diplomatic and indirect way. 
Following Belgrade's pressures, a new leadership of the Danube Commission was 
chosen, made up of the Yugoslavian Djuric as General Secretary, the Hungarian 
Silk as president and the Bulgarian Guenov as Vice President. Certain procedures 
of the Commission were also changed, through which the attributions of the 
Secretariat were diminished. Since then, the Danube Commission served, through 
its innovations applied by the new leadership in the Kremlin, as a laboratory for 
experiments of Soviet foreign policy, both in the communist world and in East-
West relations. Inside the communist bloc there was a shift from bilateral to 
multilateral relations in the technical field and the "thaw" of the Danube 
Commission manifested itself by its members' participation in international 
conferences concerning the development of transport and trade; by transparency of 
its activities- in June 1956, an observer from the European economic institutions 
was invited, for the first time, to participate in the plenary session; by launching 
projects concerning the development of the Danube for a better navigation, by 
resuming trade and economic relations with Western countries and by technical 
cooperation with specialized agencies of the United Nations.1 
The Danube River's openness to trade with the West had been a major policy 
change that the Soviet authorities have assumed after the death of Stalin. In order 
to gain credibility, in view of attracting technical cooperation of the Western 
democracies and in view of the reintegration of the Danube in major international 
trade routes, the communist states firstly had to truly link the navigation on the 
entire course of the river. As such, the mutual exchange of information between the 
communist states on the river's basin and the other two non-Communist riparian 
states - Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany - had become a necessity. 
Therefore, the two countries, following the received invitation, have sent their 
representatives, starting from June 1957, to participate as experts in the plenary 
sessions of the Danube Commission and at the activity of various permanent 
subcommittees. (Catell, 1960, pp. 392-293) On the 23rd of May 1955, the Soviet 
Union urged Austria to join the Danube Commission. Following pressures from its 
western allies which feared the inclusion of the Austrian Danube sector in the 
sphere of Soviet control, Vienna initially refused to join the Danube Commission. 
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Only in January 1960 did Austria effectively join the Danube Commission.1 Not 
the same could be achieved with the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviet 
estimation in the organization of the Belgrade Conference (30 July-18 August 
1948), that denied the presence of this state's representatives in the workings of the 
River’s development, proved to be incorrect. Meanwhile, the fact that Stalin 
blocked the Danube in the communist sector, determined the Federal German 
authorities to finalize the Nazi project that targeted the unification of the Danube 
River with the Rhine. The accomplishment of this objective had two major 
negative effects on the navigation on the communist sector of the Danube: the 
German commercial traffic on the Upper Danube was conducted through the Rhine 
towards the North Sea; respectively, the Federal Republic of Germany showed no 
interest in joining the Danube Commission. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Although triggered by entirely other causes, the refusal of the Yugoslavian 
communist leader Josip Broz Tito to unconditionally subordinate to Joseph 
Vissarionovich Stalin had major consequences in terms of navigation and the 
international regime established on the Danube River by the Belgrade Agreement 
(August 18th 1948). Until the death of Stalin, between 1948 and 1953, the conflict 
had severely damaged the navigation on the communist sector of the Danube and 
led to Moscow's total control on the Danube Commission through the body's 
Secretariat. After Stalin's death (March 1953), the new Kremlin leader, Nikita 
Sergeyevich Khrushchev, was forced to make a number of concessions towards 
Yugoslavia - and, as default, to other communist countries along the Danube - in 
order to settle the conflict, concessions that have reformed the Danube 
Commission, have reinstated the territorial authorities the sovereignty over their 
own river sections and have led by a "thaw" between East and West, materialized 
by Austria's adherence to the Danube Commission in 1960. 
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